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ABSTRACT Accurate and reliable estimation of generator's dynamic state vectors in real time 
are critical to the monitoring and control of power systems. A robust Cubature Kalman Filter 
(RCKF) based approach is proposed for dynamic state estimation (DSE) of generators under 
cyber attacks in this paper. First, two types of cyber attacks, namely false data injection and 
denial of service attacks, are modelled and thereby introduced into DSE of a generator by mixing 
the attack vectors with the measurement data; Second, under cyber attacks with different degrees 
of sophistication, the RCKF algorithm and the Cubature Kalman Filter (CKF) algorithm are 
adopted to the DSE, and then the two algorithms are compared and discussed.  The novelty of this 
study lies primarily in our attempt to introduce cyber attacks into DSE of generators.  The 
simulation results on the IEEE 9-bus system and the New England 16-machine 68-bus system 
verify the effectiveness and superiority of the RCKF. 
INDEX TERMS Dynamic state estimation, cyber attacks, false data injection, denial of service, generator, 
robust cubature Kalman filter, PMU data 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the operation of a power system, it is of critical 
importance to obtain accurate and reliable dynamic 
state vectors in real time for monitoring and 
controlling of a generator [1-3]. As a typical cyber-
physical system, power systems have emerged and 
been in operation for more than a hundred years, but 
the increasing number of cyber attacks, natural 
disasters, and reliance on communication control has 
led to new sources of failure and cascading failure.  In 
addition, with the large-scale integration of renewable 
energy and new power electronics, the uncertainty of 
power systems has also increased [4-6]. All these 
changes have brought new challenges to maintaining 
safe and reliable operation of the system. At the same 
time, the successful use of phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) provides new means for power system state 
estimation, stability assessment, and control [7, 8]. 
The term “dynamic state estimation” (DSE) dates back 
to the 1970s [9]. The Kalman filtering method was 
previously used to estimate the state of power systems. 
Recently, there have been many studies on state 
estimation based on electromechanical transients [10-11]. 
Various nonlinear filtering methods have been utilized for 
the DSE of generators. For example: Particle Filter (PF) 
[12-13], extended Kalman filter (EKF) [14-15], unscented 
Kalman filter (UKF) [16-17], cubature Kalman filter 
(CKF) [18-19]. In general, UKF is superior to EKF in 
terms of estimated performance; in fact, the specific 
results depend on the distribution of sigma points and the 
state dimension. 
Today’s power systems are facing increasingly 
serious cyber threats, among which false data 
injection (FDI) and denial of service (DoS) attacks 
are two typical attacks among them. The FDI attack 
considers measurement equipment as an attack object 
in power systems and has the ability to avoid bad data 
detection, which deviates the actual estimate from the 
normal value. In the operation and monitor of power 
systems, FDI attacks worsen online security 
assessment of power systems. In terms of economic 
benefits, FDI attacks can affect the normal 
dispatching plan of power systems, increase the 
operating cost of the system, and may even cause a 
large-scale blackout accident due to the wrong 
scheduling plan resulting from the attacks. On 
December 23, 2015, the large-area blackout in 
Ukraine was a real case of FDI attacking the power 
system [20]. As another typical cyber attack, the DoS 
attack aims to continuously transmit the forged data 
packets on the communication channel of cyber, so 
that the communication channel connecting the 
control center and the remote terminal is not working 
properly. The information can’t be delivered 
normally, resulting in the loss of the data packet and 
erroneous estimation results. Therefore, these cyber 
attacks pose a significant threat to the normal 
operation power systems.  
In recent years, cyber attacks have become a hot 
topic in power system studies. In [21], a detection 
model based on extreme learning machine was 
proposed to test and identify FDI attacks. A DSE-
based risk mitigation strategy was presented for 
eliminating threat levels from cyber attacks in [22]. 
Furthermore, reference [23] developed a hybrid 
filtering algorithm to deal with the attacks of power 
systems by considering the influence of PMU. In [24], 
from the perspective of the attacker, the FDI attack based 
on the DC power flow model for state estimation was 
proposed. The principal component analysis method and 
the sparseness of the attack matrix were used to study 
FDI attacks [25, 26]. Moreover, in [27], the influence of 
Kalman filter based on model uncertainty and malicious 
cyber attacks on the dynamic estimation of power 
systems was studied. Reference [28] showed that the 
attacker constructs an undetectable attack vector for AC 
state estimation by studying in a special region of the 
system. In terms of detection of the FDI attack, a short-
term state prediction method was proposed in [29]. For 
the DoS attacks, the references of [30-33] are as follows: 
A special DoS attack mode for the performance of a 
cyber-physical system was proposed in [30]. The best 
DoS attack plan and scheme based on the cost function 
was studied in [31]. Besides, in [32], the remote state 
estimation of cyber-physical systems under DoS attacks 
based on signal interference was researched. For the 
general system, the algorithm about attack power 
allocation was proposed in [33]. In summary, in the field 
of state estimations, the existing methods only consider 
the inclusion of cyber attacks in the power flow model. 
To the best of authors’ knowledge, until now no study 
in the literature has reported the DSE of generators 
under cyber attacks. 
In this paper, an RCKF-based DSE method is 
proposed for generators under cyber attacks. First, the 
FDI and DoS attacks are modelled and thereby 
introduced into the DSE by mixing the attack vectors 
with the measurement data; second, the RCKF 
algorithm and the CKF algorithm are adopted to the 
DSE under cyber attacks, and then the two algorithms 
are compared and discussed. The main contributions 
of this paper are as follows: 
(1) This work is the first attempt to perform 
dynamic state estimation of generators under cyber 
attacks. Two types of cyber attacks, namely FDI and 
DoS, are modelled and for the first time introduced 
into DSE of a generator.  
(2) Under cyber attacks with different degrees of 
sophistication, the RCKF algorithm and the CKF 
algorithm are adopted to the DSE of generators, and 
then the two algorithms are compared and discussed. 
(3) The simulation results on the IEEE 9-bus 
system and the New England 16-machine 68-bus 
system verify the effectiveness and applicability of 
the RCKF under different attacks. Furthermore, the 
results also demonstrate that the RCKF performs 
better than the CKF in the presence of cyber attacks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the 
generator model is described in Section II. Section III 
introduces the modelling of attack models. Section IV 
gives the detailed RCKF-based DSE of generators under 
cyber attacks. Section V demonstrates simulation results 
on two IEEE test systems, and finally, the conclusions are 
drawn in section VI. 
II. GENERATOR MODEL 
Generally, in the process of estimating the state of 
power systems, the system equations and the 
measurement equations are concentrated in the 
following equation [1-3, 22, 27, 31-34] 
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where x represents the state vector, u  refers to the 
control vector, and z is the measurement vector; f and h 
are the state equation and the measurement equation, 
respectively; v and w are system deviation and 
measurement deviation respectively, which obey the 
normal distribution with the mean 0 and the variance 
matrices kQ  and kR . Here, kQ  and kR  are the system 
and measurement noise variance matrices, k is the 
moment. 
The fourth-order transient model of a generator is 
shown as follows [1, 2, 22, 27, 34]: 
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where 
'
dE  is the d-axis transient voltage of a generator; 
'
qE  is the q-axis transient voltage of a generator;   is the 
rotor speed; JT  is the inertia time constant; mT  represents 
the mechanical torque. fE  is the field voltage; eT  
represents the electromagnetic torque; D  represents the 
damping coefficient;   is the rotor angle. ' 0dT  and di  are 
respectively d-axis transient time constant and d-axis 
output currents; dX  and 
'
dX  are d-axis reactance and d-
axis transient reactance; 
'
0qT  and qi  are respectively q-
axis transient time constant and q-axis output currents, 
respectively; qX  and 
'
qX  are respectively q-axis 
reactance and q-axis transient reactance. 
Measurement vectors include  ,   and qX . The 
measurement equation is listed as follows [1, 3]: 
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where z  and z  are the measurements of the rotor 
speed and the rotor angle, respectively.
z
eP  denotes the 
measurements of the electromagnetic power of a 
generator.U  and   are the magnitude and phase angle of 
the generator terminal voltage [1]. 
The measurement noise covariance matrix 1kR   is  
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where 
2
z
  and 
2
z
  are the measurement variance of rotor 
angle and rotor speed, and 
2
ez
P  is the measurement 
variance of electromagnetic power. 
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where U =0.2%,  =0.2
o
. 
In the DSE of a generator, the state vector, the 
measurement vector, and the control vector are 
specifically shown as [1, 29]: 
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The mechanical torque and the field voltage can be 
obtained from the governor model and the exciter model 
respectively. The governor model is shown below: 
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FIGURE 1. Governor model 
where ref  is the rated speed of the generator rotor, 1 r  is 
the steady-state gain, maxT  is the maximum power order, 
sT  is the servo time constant, cT  refers to the turbine time 
constant, 3T  is the transient gain time constant, 4T  is the 
time constant to set percentage, 5T  is the reheater time 
constant. 
The exciter model is shown as follows: 
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FIGURE 2. Exciter model 
where rV is the regulator output voltage, aK is the 
voltage regulator gain, aT is the voltage regulator time 
constant, bV is the potential circuit voltage output, gK is 
the feedback constant, fE  is the field voltage. 
III. ATTACK MODELS 
A. FDI ATTACK 
For the DSE of generators, state vectors are 
uniformly represented as  1 2 3, , ,...
T
kx x x x x . The 
measurement vectors are uniformly expressed as 
 1 2 3, , ,...,
T
lz z z z z . The measurement equation is as 
follows: 
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where 
1 1
2 1
1
( ) [ ( ,..., ),
( ,..., ),
...
( ,..., )]
k
k
T
l k
h x h x x
h x x
h x x

                          (8) 
represents the nonlinear relationship between the state 
vector and the measurement vector, and e  denotes the 
measurement error. 
Take the function h1() as an example, Taylor’s 
formula is used to extend h1(). Since the state vectors 
of generators can’t change suddenly during the 
electromechanical transient process, the high-order 
parts of h1() are too small and can be ignored. 
Therefore, the linearized measurement equation is 
obtained as follows: 
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where (0) (0)
1 ,..., kx x  are initial values of 1,..., kx x , and they 
are close to 
1,..., kx x ; 
1 1
1 0 0
,...,
k
h h
x x
 
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are the calculation 
results by introducing (0) (0)
1 ,..., kx x  into these partial 
derivatives; 
1e  is a constant matrix. Thereby, (7) can be 
further expressed as follows: 
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where H is the Jacobian matrix, e  is regarded as the 
new measurement error. In this study, by substituting (3) 
into (11), the matrix H can be obtained as 
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Bad data that often occurs with a large terrible 
impact on the results of state estimation The 
application of the residual equation can largely 
eliminate the influence of bad data [29]. 
The residual between z and its estimated vector is 
given by the following equation [28]: 
r z z                                     (13) 
where ˆ( )z h x  represents the estimated vector of z. 
According to the definition of the residual, Eq. (13) 
can be rewritten as follows [20, 21, 24, 25]: 
ˆr z Hx                                   (14) 
If  1,...,
T
la a a  is used to represent the false data 
injected by the attacker in the measurement vector, the 
actual measurement vector is az z a  .  1,...,
T
kc c c  
represents the error vector that is brought into by the FDI 
attack in the state vector, the elements of it are randomly 
generated by a Gaussian random variable with different 
variances, and the estimation of state vector becomes 
ˆ ˆ
ax x c   [25]. According to (14), the measurement 
residual is obtained as [15] 
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Obviously, a Hc  is a sufficient condition for (16). 
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Eq. (16) suggests that the residual values before and 
after the FDI attack are equal, and then the residual-based 
bad data detection is unable to identify the false data. 
Consequently, the FDI attack is successfully applied to 
the measurement vector when the attack is modelled as 
a Hc . In this case, the measurement vector under the 
attack has a larger deviation from the true vector, which 
will undermine the safe and stable operation of generators 
[28]. 
If the errors of attack vectors are taken into account, 
the residual values before and after the FDI attack are not 
equal [29]. Then the following formula is obtained: 
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However, if the residual value of the measurement data 
is less than the detection threshold in the detection 
process, the FDI attacks are still successfully hidden. 
Furthermore, the detection threshold BJ is determined by 
superimposing a certain redundancy on the normal 
maximum estimated deviation. The formula of the 
detection is as follows: 
ˆ ˆ
a a Jz Hx z Hx B                      (18) 
Thus, if 
az  satisfies (18), the FDI attacks can be 
implemented to the DSE of generators. 
B. DoS ATTACK  
The essence of DoS attacks is the process of packet 
(i.e., measurement data) loss. At present, there are usually 
two types of modelling for the characteristic of packet 
loss. The first one is described by the Bernoulli 
distribution [31], while the second is described by the 
Markov model [33]. Taking into account the 
characteristics of the memoryless Bernoulli process in 
DoS attacks, the first method is here chosen to model 
DoS attacks. 
When an attacker initiates d consecutive DoS attacks, it 
may result in successive loss of packets. For example, 
while the measurement data at the (k-d)th moment is 
successfully transmitted, the attacker launches an attack 
at the next moment. The period of consecutive attacks is 
from the (k-d+1)th moment to the kth moment, and up to 
d packets are lost during this period. Then, the Bernoulli 
distribution is used to depict the packet loss 
characteristics caused by DoS attacks. In order to describe 
the transmission of the measurement data 
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where 
k  is the state matrix of measurement vector 
transmission, ( )k i  denotes the element i in the matrix 
k (  1, 1i d  ), representing the transmission state of 
the measurement 1k iz    at the (k-i+1)th moment. If 
( ) 0k i  , the measurement 1k iz    is lost; otherwise, it is 
successfully transmitted. (0,1)  denotes the probability 
of packet loss. And thereby, the measurement data 
actually received by the state estimator under DoS attacks 
can be indicated as: 
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where '
kz  denotes the measurement data under the DoS 
attack. 
IV. RCKF-BASED DSE OF GENERATORS 
A. CUBATURE KALMAN FILTER 
The spherical cubature and the Gaussian quadrature 
rules are utilized to estimate the probability density 
functions of the state space and the measurement space in 
CKF. Fig. 3 shows the basic structure of the DSE for 
generators based on the CKF. The specific process 
includes the following two stages [1]: 
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FIGURE 3. DSE based on CKF 
(1)Forecasting stage 
At this stage, U  and   are all available from PMUs. 
Decouple the generator from the system, and then obtain 
the predicted values of state vectors at moment k+1 by the 
state equation and the state vectors of at moment k, which 
is shown as follows: 
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where 
k k
P  denotes the estimation error variance matrix of 
the state vector at moment k obtained from moment k-1; 
,i k k
X  represents the cubature points of the state vectors at 
moment k; i n  , i=1,2,...2n, n is the dimension of the 
state vector. *
,i k k
X  represents the predicted values of the 
cubature points obtained by the state equation;
1
ˆ
k k
x

 is the 
predicted values of the state vectors;
1k k
P

 refers to the 
predicted error variance matrix of the state vectors. 
(2)Filtering stage 
The predicted values of the state vectors at the 
forecasting stage are calculated by the measurement 
vector 1kz  , and thereafter obtain the estimation of the 
state vectors at moment k+1. The specific process is as 
follows: 
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1
ˆ
k k
x

; 
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 is the cubature points of forecast 
values of the measurements; 
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 is the forecast values 
of the measurements obtained by the weighted summation 
of 
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; 
, 1zz k k
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 is the measurement error variance 
matrix; 
, 1xz k k
P

 is the cross-error variance matrix; 
1kW   is 
the filter gain; 
1 1
ˆ
k k
x
 
 is the final estimation at moment 
k+1; 
1 1k k
P
 
 is the updated estimation error variance 
matrix of state vectors at moment k+1. 
B. ROBUST CUBATURE KALMAN FILTER 
Accurate system models and noise statistics are 
prerequisites for the traditional CKF for obtaining a good 
estimate. In this paper, the generator model is assumed to 
be accurate. However, due to environmental factors, bad 
data inevitably appears in PMU measurement vectors, 
causing the measurement error variance matrix 
1kR   to be 
inconsistent with the actual error. This leads to that the 
CKF is unable to complete the accurate correction of the 
predicted values in the filtering stage. 
By combining the robust M estimation theory and the 
CKF, the RCKF has the on-line adjustment capability for 
measuring noise statistics. By using the RCKF, accurate 
state estimation results can still be obtained even if the 
measurements contain bad data. 
The basic process of the RCKF is generally the same as 
that of the CKF except for (31) and (32). Specifically 
speaking, the measurement error variance matrix before 
correction is replaced by the corrected measurement error 
variance matrix in (31). 
1kR   is the measurement error variance matrix before 
correction, 
1kR   is the corrected measurement error 
variance matrix according to the following formula: 
1
1kR P

                              (36) 
where P  is the equivalence weight matrix. 
In this work, the Huber method is used to calculate the 
equivalence weight matrix P  [1], which is given by  
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where 
,m mp  and ,m np  are respectively a diagonal and 
non-diagonal element of the matrix P . In the matrix 
1kR  , ,m m  and ,m n  denote a diagonal and non-diagonal 
element. Since the measurement error variance matrix in 
the DSE of generators is a diagonal matrix, the non-
diagonal elements 
,m n  are taken as zero. rm is the 
corresponding residual component of measurement 
vectors 
mz , while mr   is the corresponding standard 
residual component. 
m
  is the mean square error of rm. C 
is a given constant (ranging from 1.3 to 2.0), and it is here 
taken as 1.5 through the try-and-error method. These 
vectors are expressed as [1]: 
' /m m rmr r                                (39) 
1 1
ˆ( )m k mk kr z z                            (40) 
,, 1
( )rm m mzz k kP                            (41) 
where 
, 1zz k k
P

 is the measurement error variance matrix 
before correction. 
In the process of the RCKF-based DSE of generators, 
1
ˆ
k k
x

 and 
1 1
ˆ
k k
x
 
 are approximately equal before attacks. 
When attack vectors are implemented into the 
measurement vectors, 
1 1
ˆ
k k
x
 
 obtained in the filtering 
stage will change. But at this time, 
1
ˆ
k k
x

 obtained in the 
forecasting stage remains unchanged. In this regard, this 
paper proposes an attack identification strategy, which is 
as follows: 
1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ,The attack can be identified
ˆ ˆ ,The attack cannot be identified
Jk k k k
Jk k k k
x x D
x x D
  
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  


 

(42) 
where 
JD  is 1 1 1ˆ ˆmax k k k kx x    during the period of 
the normal estimation. 
C. SOLUTION PROCESS 
As shown in Fig. 4, the RCKF-based solution process 
is described as follows: 
1) Construction of the state and measurement equations: 
Based on the estimation vector ˆ
kx  at moment k, the state 
equation of a generator is constructed. Assuming that the 
magnitude and phase angle of the generator terminal 
voltage ( , )U   are available from PMUs, the 
measurement equation of a generator is thereby 
constructed. 
2) Modelling of cyber attacks: The Jacobian matrix H 
is obtained from (14). For the FDI attack, the attack 
vector is obtained through multiplying the Jacobian 
matrix by the error vector of state vector obeying 
Gaussian distributions with different standard deviations. 
(2) Regarding the DoS attack, the transmission state 
matrix 
k  obeying the Bernoulli distribution is 
established. 
3) Implementation of cyber attacks: On the basis of the 
predicted values of state vectors, the FDI attack vectors 
are implemented to the measurement vectors 
1kz  , and 
then they are detected via the bad data detection. For the 
DoS attack, the measurement vector under the attack is 
formed by multiplying the elements of the matrix 
k by 
the corresponding elements of the measurement matrix. 
4) Estimation results: In the filtering stage of the RCKF, 
the estimated values at moment k+1 under attacks are 
obtained according to (27) ~ (35). And thereby, based on 
the estimated values, the mechanical torque is calculated 
by the governor. At the same time, the estimation results 
need to be tested for the attack identification. After that, 
perform the DSE based on the RCKF until the simulation 
is finished. 
Start
Estimated values of state 
vectors at moment k
State equation 
 Jacobian 
matrix 
Attack 
vector
Bad data 
detection
PMUs 
Estimated values of state 
vectors at moment k+1
Terminate the 
simulation?
PMU 
data 
Governor
error 
vector 
of state 
vector
mT,U 
No
1kz 
Yes
End
1k 
FDI attack 
DOS attack 
k=1
k=k+1
Predicted values of state 
vectors at moment k+1
Measurement equation
Attack identification
FIGURE 4. Solution process 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
A. SIMULATION SETTINGS 
All simulations have been performed under the 
MATLAB environment on a desktop PC equipped with 
Intel Core i5-4590 3.3GHz CPU and 8 GB RAM. Note 
that in this study, PMU data are simulated through 
detailed numerical simulations via the power system 
toolbox (PST).  
The simulation data are listed as follows: 1) The 
sampling rate is assumed 50 samples/s; 2) The simulation 
time step is set to 0.02 s; 3) The standard deviations of the 
rotor angle and the rotor speed are respectively 2° and 
0.1%; 4) The standard deviations of the phase angle and 
amplitude of terminal voltages are 0.1° and 0.1%；5) A 
PMU is equipped at the terminal of each generator [1, 27]. 
B. EVALUATION INDEX 
To compare the estimation results, three different 
indices are defined as follows [1], [2]: 
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where ˆ
ix  and itx  are respectively the estimated value and 
the true value,
izx  represents the measurement value, N 
denotes the number of sampling points. The evaluation 
index 
1  can measure the filtering performance of the 
same state estimation method under different cyber 
attacks;
2  can evaluate the filtering performances of 
different state estimation methods under the same cyber 
attack;
3  can quantitatively evaluate the estimation results 
for any estimation method under any attack. 
C. IEEE 9-BUS SYSTEM 
This system contains 3 generators, 3 transformers, and 
9 buses. The fault settings are as follows: a three-phase 
short-circuit fault occurs at bus 4 at t=1.2s, then the fault 
is cleared at t=1.5s. The entire simulation process lasts 
20s. For ease of analysis without loss of generality, 
generator 1 is taken as an example to examine the 
performances of the RCKF algorithm. Here, the detection 
threshold of the bad data detection is set to 2.1JB   
through simulations, since all injected false data can just 
pass the detection while bad data can be detected in this 
situation. 
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FIGURE 5. IEEE 9-bus system 
1) SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER FDI ATTACKS 
In terms of FDI attacks, according to the error vector of 
the state vector, three attack scenarios are designed, as 
shown in Table I [25]. 
TABLE I  
SCENARIOS of FDI ATTACKS 
Attack Scenarios 
Error Vector of State 
Vector 
FDI-scenario 1 2(0, ), 0.0001c N     
FDI-scenario 2 2(0, ), 0.001c N     
FDI-scenario 3 2(0, ), 0.01c N     
In Table I, FDI-scenarios 1-3 respectively indicate that 
in three attack scenarios, the error vectors of the state 
vectors obey the Gaussian distribution with the mean 0 
and the standard deviations 0.0001, 0.001 and 0.01. 
Figs. 6, 8 and 10 show the estimated results of the 
generator’s rotor angle under three FDI attack scenarios, 
while Figs. 7, 9 and 11 illustrate the estimation results of 
the rotor speed under the scenarios. 
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FIGURE 10. Rotor angle under FDI-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 11. Rotor speed under FDI-scenario 3 
From Figs. 6-11, it can be observed that the estimation 
results of the RCKF are very close to the true values in 
the attack period from t=4s to 12s. This result verifies the 
effectiveness of the RCKF under FDI attacks. 
Furthermore, the estimated results of the RCKF are closer 
to the true values than those of the CKF, which suggests 
that the filtering ability of the RCKF is better than that of 
the CKF. 
The estimation indices of generator 1 in the scenarios 
are shown in Table II. 
Table II  
ESTIMATION INDICES 
Attack 
scenario 
Index Parameter CKF RCKF 
FDI-
scenario 1 
1  
  7.8923e-04 6.8549e-04 
  2.8102e-04 2.6038e-04 
2  
  0.0021 0.0017 
  1.7812e-05 1.6503e-05 
3  
  7.0630e-05 6.0998e-05 
  1.7014e-05 1.5821e-05 
FDI-
scenario 2 
1  
  8.9725e-04 6.8921e-04 
  3.2047e-04 2.6147e-04 
2  
  0.0025 0.0018 
  2.2344e-05 1.6386e-05 
3  
  7.9030e-05 6.4476e-05 
  2.1003e-05 1.5841e-05 
FDI-
scenario 3 
1  
  0.0091 6.9046e-04 
  0.0019 2.6201e-04 
2  
  0.0232 0.0019 
  1.0908e-04 1.7344e-05 
3  
  6.6115e-04 6.8111e-05 
  1.0408e-04 1.5969e-05 
Table II gives the state estimation indices of generator 
1 based on the CKF and the RCKF under three FDI attack 
scenarios. From Table II, it can be seen that: (1) For the 
index 
1 , the values based on the RCKF are not much 
different from each other. (2) As far as index 
2  is 
concerned, under attack scenario 1, the filtering 
accuracies of the RCKF are respectively 19% and 7.3% 
higher than those of the CKF for the rotor angle and the 
rotor speed; under attack scenario 2, the filtering 
accuracies of the RCKF are increased by 28% and 27% 
compared with those of the CKF; under attack scenario 3, 
the filtering accuracies of the RCKF are increased by 91.8% 
and 84% compared with those of the CKF. (3) Regarding 
the index 
3 , the index values of the RCKF are less than 
those of the CKF. In general, the effectiveness of the 
RCKF is verified under different FDI attack scenarios. 
The superiority of the RCKF under these scenarios 
compared with the CKF is also confirmed. 
2) SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER DOS ATTACKS 
According to the packet loss rate of DoS attacks, four 
attack scenarios are designed, as shown in Table III [31]. 
Table III 
SCENARIOS of DoS ATTACKS 
Attack Scenarios Packet Loss Rate 
DoS-scenario 1 1.00 
DoS-scenario 2 0.95 
DoS-scenario 3 0.85 
DoS-scenario 4 0.75 
In Table III, DoS-scenarios 1-4 respectively indicate 
that in four attack scenarios, the packet loss rate of the 
measurement data is 1, 0.95, 0.85 and 0.75. 
Figs. 12, 14, 16 and 18 show the estimated results of 
the generator's rotor angle under four DoS attack 
scenarios. Figs. 13, 15, 17 and 19 show the estimated 
results of rotor speed under these DoS attack scenarios. 
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
t(s)
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1
1.002
ro
to
r 
sp
e
ed
(p
.u
.)
CKF
TRUE
RCKF
FIGURE 13. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 1 
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FIGURE 14. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 2 
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FIGURE 16. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 17. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 18. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 4 
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FIGURE 19. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 4 
From Figs. 12-19, ones can observe that in the attack 
period from t=4s to 12s, the attack frequency changes 
with the decrease of the packet loss rate, and the 
estimated values of the RCKF are much closer to the true 
values than those of the CKF. Based on these results, the 
effectiveness and superiority of the RCKF are verified 
under DoS attacks. 
The state estimation indices of generator 1 are shown 
in Table IV. 
Table IV 
ESTIMATION INDICES 
Attack 
scenario 
Index Parameter CKF RCKF 
DoS-scenario 
1 
1  
  0.6145 0.0019 
  0.1409 2.5930e-04 
2  
  0.0251 9.9827e-05 
  0.0074 1.5696e-05 
3  
  0.0458 1.6683e-04 
  0.0071 1.5626e-05 
DoS-scenario 
2 
1  
  0.5866 0.0018 
  0.1347 2.5925e-04 
2  
  0.0253 9.9477e-05 
  0.0070 1.5685e-05 
3  
  0.0448 1.6640e-04 
  0.0069 1.5619e-05 
DoS-scenario 
3 
1  
  0.5258 0.0017 
  0.1192 2.5918e-04 
2  
  0.0254 9.8680e-05 
  0.0065 1.5616e-05 
3  
  0.0421 1.6549e-04 
  0.0064 1.5612e-05 
DoS-scenario 
4 
1  
  0.4605 0.0015 
  0.1037 2.5907e-04 
2  
  0.0258 9.7460e-05 
  0.0059 1.5288e-05 
3  
  0.0391 1.6378e-04 
  0.0061 1.5604e-05 
Table IV gives the state estimation indices of generator 
1 based on the two algorithms under three DoS attack 
scenarios. From Table IV, it can be seen that: (1) For the 
RCKF, the values of 
1  are almost unchanged in three 
different attack scenarios. (2) For index 
2 , under attack 
scenario 1, the values of the CKF are respectively 251 
and 471 times that of those of the RCKF about the rotor 
angle and the rotor speed; under attack scenario 2, the 
values of the CKF are respectively 254 and 446 times that 
of those of the RCKF; under attack scenario 3, the values 
of the CKF are respectively 257 and 416 times that of 
those of the RCKF; under attack scenario 4, the values of 
the CKF are respectively 265 and 386 times that of those 
of the RCKF. (3) For the index 
3 , the index values of the 
CKF are greater than those of the RCKF. In short, the 
effectiveness of the RCKF under DoS attacks is verified 
and the superiority of the RCKF compared with the CKF 
under DoS attacks is validated. 
D. NEW ENGLAND 16 MACHINE 68 BUS SYSTEM 
This system consisting of 16 synchronous generators, 
68 buses, and 86 lines is a well-known test system in the 
field of state estimation [1, 27]. Taken as generator 1 as 
an example, a three-phase short-circuit fault occurs at bus 
6 at t=1s and then is removed at t=1.2s. The simulation 
lasts 10s and the detection threshold is here set to 
1.6JB   using the same approach as that in the previous 
IEEE 9-bus test system. 
 
FIGURE 20. New England 16-machine-68-bus system 
1) SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER FDI ATTACKS 
In order to facilitate comparative analysis, the settings 
of the FDI attack scenarios in this system are shown in 
Table V: 
TABLE V 
SCENARIOS of FDI ATTACKS 
Attack Scenarios 
Error Vector of State 
Vector 
FDI-scenario 1 2(0, ), 0.01c N    
FDI-scenario 2 2(0, ), 0.1c N    
FDI-scenario 3 2(0, ), 1c N    
In Table V, FDI-scenarios 1-3 respectively indicate 
that in three attack scenarios, the error vectors of the state 
vectors obey the Gaussian distribution with the mean 0 
and the standard deviations 0.01, 0.1 and 1. 
Figs. 21, 23 and 25 show that estimated results of the 
rotor angle in three FDI attack scenarios respectively; 
Figs. 22, 24 and 26 show that estimated results of the 
rotor speed under three attack scenarios respectively. 
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FIGURE 21. Rotor angle under FDI-scenario 1 
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FIGURE 22. Rotor speed under FDI-scenario 1 
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FIGURE 23. Rotor angle under FDI-scenario 2 
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FIGURE 24. Rotor speed under FDI-scenario 2 
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FIGURE 25. Rotor angle under FDI-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 26. Rotor speed under FDI-scenario 3 
From Figs. 21-26, it can be seen that the estimated 
values of the RCKF are significantly closer to the true 
values than those of the CKF in the attack period from 
t=4s to 8s. This verifies the effectiveness and applicability 
of the RCKF under three FDI attack scenarios for the 
larger system. And it also proves that the RCKF is better 
than the CKF in terms of the filtering ability. 
The estimation indices of generator 1 are shown in 
Table VI. 
Table VI 
ESTIMATION INDICES OF GENERATOR 1 
Attack 
scenario 
index parameter CKF RCKF 
FDI-
scenario 1 
1  
  5.0189e-04 4.9123e-04 
  6.0381e-05 3.1985e-05 
2  
  7.5710e-04 5.5718e-04 
  7.0899e-05 1.9432e-05 
3  
  2.7641e-05 4.0908e-05 
  4.8011e-06 3.9398e-06 
FDI-
scenario 2 
1  
  0.0219 4.9588e-04 
  0.0036 3.2311e-05 
2  
  0.0236 6.1624e-04 
  0.0059 8.9818e-05 
3  
  0.0016 4.2342e-05 
  2.5758e-04 3.9535e-06 
FDI-
scenario 3 
1  
  0.4335 4.9959e-04 
  0.0743 3.2638e-05 
2  
  0.0440 9.9376e-05 
  0.0068 5.1218e-06 
3  
  0.0321 4.4382e-05 
  0.0053 3.9642e-06 
Table V gives the state estimation indices of generator 
1 based on the CKF and the RCKF under three FDI attack 
scenarios. From Table V, it can be observed that: (1) In 
the New England 16-machine 68-bus system, for the 
index 
1 , the values of the rotor angle of the RCKF are 
respectively only increased by 0.9% and 0.7% with the 
diversification of attack scenarios, the values of the rotor 
speed of the RCKF don't change significantly. (2) In 
terms of the index 
2 , the values of the CKF about the 
rotor angle and the rotor speed are 26.4% and 72.6% 
higher than those of the RCKF under attack scenario 1; 
under attack scenario 2, the values of the CKF are 
increased by 96.4% and 97.5% compared with those of 
the RCKF; under attack scenario 3, the values are 
increased by 98.8% and 98.9%. (3) For the index 
3 , the 
values of the RCKF are always less than those of the CKF 
under three attack scenarios. These phenomena suggest 
that the filtering performance of the RCKF is still better 
than that of the CKF in the larger system. 
2) SIMULATION RESULTS UNDER DOS ATTACKS 
Similar to the FDI attacks, the settings of the DoS 
attack scenarios in this system are as same as those in the 
IEEE 9-bus system. 
Figs. 27, 29, 31 and 33 show the estimated results of 
the rotor angle under different DoS attack scenarios. 
Moreover, Figs. 28, 30, 32 and 34 show the estimated 
results of the rotor speed. 
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FIGURE 27. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 1 
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FIGURE 28. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 1 
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FIGURE 29. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 2 
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FIGURE 30. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 2 
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FIGURE 31. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 32. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 3 
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FIGURE 33. Rotor angle under DoS-scenario 4 
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FIGURE 34. Rotor speed under DoS-scenario 4 
From Figs. 27-34, it can be observed that the estimated 
values of the RCKF are still close to the true values with 
the different packet loss rates in this system. This verifies 
the effectiveness and adaptability of the RCKF under 
DoS attacks in the larger system. Moreover, it can be seen 
from these figures that the filtering ability of the RCKF is 
significantly superior to that of the CKF under DoS 
attacks. 
The estimation indices of generator 1 are shown in 
Table VII. 
Table VII  
ESTIMATION INDICES OF GENERATOR 1 
Attack 
scenario 
Index Parameter CKF RCKF 
DoS-
scenario 1 
1  
  0.5519 7.8748e-04 
  0.0808 4.6549e-06 
2  
  0.0307 6.7476e-05 
  0.0054 4.0097e-07 
3  
  0.0339 7.1068e-05 
  0.0061 4.1030e-07 
DoS-
scenario 2 
1  
  0.4168 7.6748e-04 
  0.0693 4.4549e-06 
2  
  0.0306 6.7233e-05 
  0.0053 4.0980e-07 
3  
  0.0314 6.9065e-05 
  0.0054 3.9477e-07 
DoS-
scenario 3 
1  
  0.3616 7.3863e-04 
  0.0601 4.3292e-06 
2  
  0.0305 6.8115e-05 
  0.0051 4.2346e-07 
3  
  0.0293 6.7146e-05 
  0.0046 3.8729e-07 
DoS-
scenario 4 
1  
  0.3319 7.1382e-04 
  0.0552 4.2560e-06 
2  
  0.0304 6.6464e-05 
  0.0052 4.3880e-07 
3  
  0.0279 6.5003e-05 
  0.0039 3.7557e-07 
Table VI gives the state estimation indices of generator 
1 based on these two algorithms under three DoS attack 
scenarios. From Table VI, it can be seen: (1) Regarding 
index 
1 , the index values of the rotor angle and the rotor 
speed obtained by using the RCKF are basically 
unchanged under different attack scenarios, which 
validates the performance of the RCKF for the larger 
system under DoS attacks. (2) For index 
2 , the index 
values of the rotor angle and the rotor speed obtained by 
the CKF are respectively 454 times and 13466 times 
higher than those of the RCKF under scenario 1; under 
scenario 2, the index values of the CKF are respectively 
increased by 454 times and 12932 times compared with 
those of the RCKF; under scenario 3, the index values of 
the CKF are respectively increased by 448 times and 
12043 times compared with those of the RCKF; under 
scenario 4, the index values of the CKF increased by 456 
times and 11622 times compared with those of the RCKF. 
(3) In terms of index 
3 , the index values of the RCKF are 
always less than those of the CKF under the four 
scenarios. The results on the above indices 
2  and 3  
suggest that the RCKF significantly outperforms the CKF 
under DoS attacks. 
From the test results on the above two systems, it can 
be seen that the filtering performance of the RCKF is 
superior to that of the CKF. The reason for this 
phenomenon is that the consequence of cyber attacks 
essentially is to introduce a large number of errors to the 
measurement data, and the RCKF can eliminate the errors 
while the CKF does not have this ability. 
E. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
In order to reasonably evaluate the computational 
efficiency of the RCKF under cyber attacks, the 
calculation times using the CKF and the RCKF are shown 
in Table VIII. 
Table VIII 
CALCULATION TIME 
Attack CKF(ms) RCKF(ms) 
FDI-scenario 1 0.123 0.137 
FDI-scenario 2 0.124 0.134 
FDI-scenario 3 0.127 0.132 
DoS-scenario 1 0.129 0.138 
DoS-scenario 2 0.128 0.139 
DoS-scenario 3 0.122 0.131 
DoS-scenario 4 0.124 0.136 
Table VII shows that the RCKF can accurately 
estimate dynamic states of generators in real time. Since 
the RCKF uses the M estimation theory to eliminate 
measurement errors caused by cyber attacks, its 
calculation time is slightly longer than that of the CKF, 
but it is still within a reasonable range. Consequently, the 
computational times demonstrate that RCKF has the 
potential to perform DSE of generators or even power 
systems in real-world applications. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the dynamic state estimation of 
generators under cyber attacks. First, attacks are modelled 
and thereby introduced into the DSE of generators; and 
then, the RCKF algorithm is adopted to estimate dynamic 
states of generators under cyber attacks with different 
degrees of sophistication. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the 
DSE of generators under cyber attacks. Based on the 
test results on two IEEE test systems, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: (1) The RCKF is capable of 
effectively performing the DSE of generators in the 
presence of cyber attacks; (2) Furthermore, the filtering 
performance of the RCKF is significantly better than that 
of the CKF. (3) For a DSE algorithm such as the CKF 
that is not capable of addressing cyber attacks, the 
estimation performances of the algorithm may be 
seriously deteriorated under attacks. 
In our future work, more types of cyber attacks will be 
introduced into the DSE of generators. In addition, the 
adopted method might be extended to address other 
power system state estimation issues. 
References 
[1] Y. Li, J. Li, J. Qi, and L. Chen, “Robust cubature Kalman filter for 
dynamic state estimation of synchronous machines under unknown 
measurement noise statistics,” IEEE Access, vol.7, pp. 29139- 
29148, Feb. 2019. 
[2] A.K. Singh, B.C. Pal, “Decentralized dynamic state estimation in 
power system using unscented transformation,” IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems., vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 794-804, Mar. 2014. 
[3] N. Zhou, D. Meng, and Z. Y. Huang, “Dynamic state estimation of 
a synchronous machine using PMU data: A comparative study,” 
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 450-460, Jan. 
2015. 
[4] Y. Li, Z. Yang, G. Li, Y. Mu, D. Zhao, C. Chen, B. Shen, 
“Optimal scheduling of isolated microgrid with an electric vehicle 
battery swapping station in multi-stakeholder scenarios: A bi-level 
programming approach via real-time pricing,” Applied Energy, 
232, pp. 54-68, Sep. 2018. 
[5] Y. Li, Z. Yang, D. Zhao, H. Lei, B. Cui, S. Li, “Incorporating 
energy storage and user experience in isolated microgrid dispatch 
using a multi-objective model,” IET Renewable Power Generation, 
vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 973-981, Apr. 2019. 
[6] Y. Li, J. Wang, D. Zhao, G. Li, and C. Chen, “A two-stage 
approach for combined heat and power economic emission 
dispatch: Combining multi-objective optimization with integrated 
decision making,” Energy, vol. 162, pp. 237–254, Nov. 2018. 
[7] V. Terzija, G. Valverde, D. Cai, P. Regulski, V. Madani, J. Fitch, 
et al, “Wide-area monitoring, protection and control of future 
electric power networks,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 1, 
pp. 80–93, Jan. 2011. 
[8] Y. Li, Z. Yang. “Application of EOS-ELM with binary Jaya-based 
feature selection to real-time transient stability assessment using 
PMU data”. IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 23092-23101, Feb. 2017. 
[9] A. S. Debs and R. E. Larson, “A dynamic estimation for tracking 
the state of a power system,” IEEE Transactions on Power 
Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-89, no. 7, pp. 1670–1678, Sep. 
1970. 
[10] E. Ghahremani and I. Kamwa, “Local and wide-area PMU-based 
decentralized dynamic state estimation in multi-machine power 
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 
547–562, Jan. 2016. 
[11] E. Ghahremani and I. Kamwa, “Dynamic state estimation in power 
system by applying the extended Kalman filter with unknown 
inputs to phasor measurements,” IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 2556–2566, Nov. 2011. 
[12] J. MinPark, C. Ki Ahn and S.Shmaliy, “Improving reliability of 
particle filter-based localization in wireless sensor networks via 
hybrid particle/fir filtering,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial 
Informatics, vol.11, no. 5, pp. 1089-1098, Oct. 2015. 
[13] Y. Li, M. Coates, “Particle filtering with invertible particle flow,” 
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 65, no. 15, pp. 
4102–4116, Aug 2017. 
[14] A. Paul, I. Kamwa, G. Joos, “Centralized dynamic state estimation 
using a federation of extended Kalman filters with intermittent 
PMU data from generator terminals,” IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 6109-6119, Nov. 2018. 
[15] C. Wang, Z.J. Qin, and Y.B. Hou, “Multi-area dynamic state 
estimation with PMU measurements by an equality constrained 
extended Kalman filter,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, 
no. 2, pp. 900-910, May 2017. 
[16] G. Anagnostou, B. C. Pal, “Derivative-free Kalman filtering based 
approaches to dynamic state estimation for power systems with 
unknown inputs,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 33, 
no. 1, pp. 116–130, 2018. 
[17] A. Rouhani and A. Abur, “Linear phasor estimator assisted 
dynamic state estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 211–219, 2018. 
[18] L. Chen, T. Bi, J. Li, “Dynamic state estimator for synchronous 
machines based on cubature Kalman filter,” Proceedings of the 
Chinese Society of Electrical Engineering, vol. 34, no. 16, pp. 
2706-2713, Jun. 2014. 
[19] A. Sharma, S.C. Srivastava, and S. Chakrabarti, “A Cubature 
kalman filter based power system dynamic state estimator,” IEEE 
Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 66, no. 8, 
pp. 2036-2045, Aug. 2017. 
[20] C. Liu , J. Wu , C. Long, and D. Kundur, “Reactance perturbation 
for detecting and identifying FDI attacks in power system state 
estimation,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 
vol.12, no. 4, pp. 763-776, Aug. 2018. 
[21] D. Xue, X. Jing, and H. Liu, “Detection of false data injection 
attacks in smart grid utilizing ELM-based OCON framework,” 
IEEE Access, vol.7, pp. 31762-31773, Mar. 2019. 
[22] A. F. Taha, J. Qi, J. Wang, and H. J. Panchal, “Risk mitigation for 
dynamic state estimation against cyber attacks and unknown 
inputs,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol.9, no. 2, pp. 886-
899, Mar. 2018. 
[23] L. Hu, Z. Wang, I. Rahman, and X. Liu, “A constrained 
optimization approach to dynamic state estimation for power 
systems including PMU and missing measurements,” IEEE 
Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol.24, no. 2, pp. 
703-710, Mar. 2016. 
[24] Y. Liu, P. Ning, M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against 
state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security, vol.14, no. 1, pp. 1-33, May. 
2011. 
[25] Z. H. Yu, W. L. Chin, “Blind false data injection attack using PCA 
approximation method in smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on 
Smart Grid, vol.6, no. 3, pp. 1219-1226, May. 2015. 
[26] B. Li, T. Ding, C. Huang, “Detecting false data injection attacks 
against power system state estimation with fast Go-Decomposition 
(GoDec) approach,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 
DOI: 10.1109/TII.2018.2875529 
[27] J. Qi, A. F. Taha, and J. Wang. “Comparing Kalman filters and 
observers for power system dynamic state estimation with model 
uncertainty and malicious cyber attacks,” IEEE Access, vol.6, pp. 
77155-77168, Dec. 2018. 
[28] X. Liu, Z. Li. “False data attacks against AC state estimation with 
incomplete network information,” IEEE Transactions on Smart 
Grid, vol.8, no. 5, pp. 2239-2248, Sep. 2017. 
[29] J. Zhao, G. Zhang, M. L. Scala, Z Y Dong, and J. Wang, “Short-
term state forecasting-aided method for detection of smart grid 
general false data injection attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Smart 
Grid, vol.8, no. 4, pp. 1580-1590, Jul. 2017. 
[30] H. Zhang, P. Cheng, L. Shi, and J. Chen, “Optimal denial-of-
service attack scheduling with energy constraint,” IEEE 
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol.60, no. 11, pp. 3023-3028, 
Nov. 2015. 
[31] H. Zhang, P. Cheng, L. Shi, and J. Chen, “Optimal DoS attack 
scheduling in wireless networked control system,” IEEE 
Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol.24, no. 3, pp. 
843-852, May. 2016. 
[32] Y. Li, D. E. Quevedo, S. Dey and L. Shi, “SINR-based DoS attack 
on remote state estimation: a game-theoretic approach,” IEEE 
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol.4, no. 3, pp. 632-
642, Sep. 2017. 
[33] G. K. Befekadu, V. Gupta, P. J. Antsaklis, “Risk-Sensitive control 
under Markov modulated Denial-of-Service(DoS) attack 
strategies,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol.60, no. 
12, pp. 3299-3304, Dec. 2015. 
[34] N. Zhou, D. Meng, and S. Lu, “Estimation of the dynamic states of 
synchronous machines using an extended particle filter,” IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, vol.28, no. 4, pp. 4152-4161, Nov. 
2013. 
